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As Malcolm Andrews argues, landscape painting in Western culture comes into its own during 
the sixteenth century, encouraged by the Italian fashion for designing villas so that views of the 
surrounding countryside become framed by the windows, thus “pictorializing [the] landscape” 
(1999, 56). In Palladio’s famous Villa Barbaro, this “pictorializing” is enhanced by frescos of 
landscapes painted by Paolo Veronese (1528–1588) that complement and supplement the 
actual land- scape views seen from the windows (Figure 7.1). Veronese’s sophisticated use of 
perspectival techniques produces a vision that blends pictorial and physical land- scape space, 
the actual and the painted melding into a sophisticated but apparently straightforward, rationally 
convincing image. Although these frescos were painted approximately 450 years ago, ideas 
about landscape have remained remarkably static since then, and it continues to be 
understood in visual terms – as a scenic background to human narrative – whether as a 
painted, filmed, or photographed image or as a physical landscape to be viewed or surveyed 
from a distance. In the next few paragraphs I want to analyse the complexities within this 
“pictorializing” before setting out an argument that understands the landscape image (and by 
implication the landscape itself) in terms that challenge its construction under the globalised 
visual assumptions of early twenty-first-century capitalism. 
 
When Leon Battista Alberti first theorised the technique of linear perspective in 
1435, his focus was to aid the painter in the “natural” depiction of objects and figures in 
order that they may make convincing stories (“istoria”) rather than understanding 
perspective as creating paintings that depicted extensive space, which is how it appears 130 
years later in Veronese’s frescos and how it is more likely to be understood today (Alberti 
2004, 67–78). Perspective now appears to describe the actual properties of space and 
this elision manifests clearly in the idea of landscape, and is reflected in the terminology: 
the horizon line, the dual vanishing and viewing points. Perspectival images appear 
somehow equivalent to both “natural human vision” and “objective external space,” so that 
they seem to show their subjects in an unmediated, direct way (Mitchell 1986, 37). As such, 
they are susceptible to ideological power, and their relationship with West- ern paradigms is 
complex and far reaching. They have intertwined with capitalist structures since the 
Renaissance not least because, as Michael Baxandall has shown, the mathematical 
knowledge that propelled perspective’s development was also an essential aspect of an 
increasingly sophisticated banking system. The formulas that were used by artists to 
measure and shape their paintings were the same formulas used by bankers and traders to 
calculate interest, convert currency, and to measure and cost their goods (Baxandall 1988, 
96). Perspective is further linked to capitalist ideology by Martin Jay when he states that 
“the placement of objects in a relational visual field, objects with no intrinsic value of their 
own out- side of these relations, may be said to have paralleled the fungibility of exchange 
value under capitalism” (Jay 1993, 59). And with the development of Alberti’s “centric ray” 
into the concept of the horizon line, perspective came to facilitate the measuring, 
mapping, and therefore conquering of space – enabling European imperialism and capitalist 
global trade (Steyerl 2011). 
 
 Perspective is fundamental to Western visual structures, and its influence on the 
development of the concept of landscape cannot be overestimated. Space became 
understood in visual terms, while perspectival images appeared to describe the separation 
of Descartes’s res extensa from res cogito through their dual vanishing and viewing points. 
In this way landscape became entrenched as “object,” opposite to and utterly distinct from 
the “subject,” which is defined as uniquely human. This is a double bind that fixed it as 
“nature” to our “culture” – passively understood as background to the foregrounded 
human – and also as “representation” – it is an image, formed in the rational mind and 
governed by the rules of perspective, and as such it problematically confirms the 
assumption of space that, as Doreen Massey states, exists as “stasis,” rather than 




Figure 7.1 Paulo Veronese, Sala a Crociera, 1560–1, fresco, Villa Barbaro, Maser 
  
This visual predicament has been critiqued since the linguistic turn that emerged 
towards the end of the twentieth century, whereby language and the interpretation of signs 
became the cornerstone for thinking within the humanities and social sci ences, and the 
study of the image as “sign” superseded previous Western notions of the rationally 
produced image of equivalence.1 The deconstructive practices that were developed by 
prominent thinkers on the image from this time such as Norman Bryson revealed the 
ideological appropriation embedded within “realist” images, i.e. the assumption that they 
can somehow directly represent their objects without mediation. However, this 
interpretative approach has resulted in an erasure of sorts, whereby images (and for 
present purpose images of landscape specifically) are ultimately seen in linguistic terms. W. 
J. T. Mitchell’s writing from 1986 reveals this methodology: 
 
The commonplace of modern studies of images, in fact, is that they must be 
understood as a kind of language; instead of providing a transparent window on the 
world, images are now regarded as the sort of sign that presents a deceptive 
appearance of naturalness and transparence concealing an opaque, distorting, 
arbitrary mechanism of representation, a process of ideological mystification. 
(Mitchell 1986, 6) 
 
Understanding realist images as signs is clearly an important means of wresting them from 
ideological control; however, as Henri Lefebvre points out, the dis- course that frames this 
approach (which included the writing of Julia Kristeva, Jacques Derrida, and Roland Barthes) 
continues to consign space to the mental realm and eliminates the social dimension from its 
characterisations (Lefebvre 1991, 5). Their thesis, Lefebvre claimed, “assumes the logical, 
epistemological and anthropological priority of language over space,” a problem whereby 
“[t]he pre-existence of an objective, neutral and empty space is simply taken as read, and only 
the space of speech (and writing) is dealt with as something that must be cre ated” (1991, 36). 
This linguistic approach continues to privilege the mental realm over the physical. It leaves 
Western spatial assumptions unchecked in the process, and therefore becomes an inherently 
problematic reformulation of the Cartesian Cogito (Lefebvre 1991, 6). This inclination to 
assume a measured space across the picture plane (whether in a perspectival painting, a 
photograph, or through a screen) as a given, as something that seems to perfectly describe 
Descartes’s res extensa, shows the difficulties that surround the imbrication of perspective, 
repre sentation, and space, and the perpetuation of landscape as a passively consumed visual 
object. 
 
With these historical burdens is it possible to re-formulate landscape images in ways 
that can shape a different relationship with the landscape itself? How can we get around the 
problems of landscape and representation? In the following sections I want to re-evaluate the 
landscape image and its construction and function under Western norms. I will argue that 
heterotopia, as theorised by Foucault, can help to do this through “suspending,” 
“neutralising,” and “inverting” the assump tions of realism, of objective space, and 
representation that surround its regimes (Foucault 2008, 17). New imaginings are crucial for a 
different formulation of landscape, and as Julian Reid shows the “space-image” is crucial for 
shaping the imagination: 
 
[The] space-image . . . is not an image of space, nor simply a spatialized form of image, 
but a space in which images live, that is, the living space of the image. It is a space in 
which the imagination locates itself as well as an image in which the imagination sees 
itself, that is, the image of imagination. 
(Reid 2018, 45) 
 
Reid defines the ship that Foucault invokes within his writing as a “space-image,” a space that is 
also an image, that transports the imagination and in which it thrives (2018, 45). I suggest that 
the landscape image, rather than continuing as an image of rationally laid out “space,” needs to 
become a “space-image” in order to establish a different imagining of landscape. It is through 
the “space-image” that landscape can be presented in non-perspectival ways that move it 
away from its association with representation and towards the persistent and shared space of 
materiality. The structures behind the image of landscape in Veronese’s painting still shape 
ideas of landscape today, and our digitalised technologies are able to appropriate visual space 
in ways far more efficient than Renaissance perspective. The globalisation processes that drive 
the early twenty-first century are not remote from or irrelevant to this predicament, for the 
digital image stream propels them and reaffirms their ideological assumptions. New imaginings 
of what landscape might be are urgently required, imaginings that enable us to see it and our 
relationship with it, in ways adequate to the seemingly insurmountable problems of 
anthropocenic climate crisis and the planetary consequences of globalised capitalism. 
 
Landscapes of difference 
 
My practice as an artist engages with these ideas and asks whether pre-perspectival 
landscape backgrounds can be re-configured so that they critique this explicitly visual 
construction of landscape. Properties specific to the heterotopia, laid out by Foucault and 
elaborated on since in various ways, can be applied in order to ena ble a nuanced 
understanding of the landscape image, formulating it as a discursive object that calls into 
question previous dichotomies, that becomes an active agent in the way space and 
environment are imagined and therefore shaped. This process defines landscape as a co-
subject by resisting the overtly optical effect pro duced by dominant (now digital, 
increasingly virtual) image forms and loosening the fixity of perspective’s viewing 
subject/viewed object matrix. In doing so the image opens up to difference. Depicted 
fragments of wilderness landscape from fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Italian painting 
(that crucially offer no perspec tival view) can return to the present as translated forms that 
challenge the assumptions of a virtualised, digital image world and propose an alternative to 
landscape as representation. Through their appropriation, these pre-modern landscape 
forms become reconfigured as radical propositions for our visual and spatial paradigms. 
Through the removal of all narrative elements (a process that also frees them from the 
specificities of their historical era) they reposition the idea of landscape from background 
towards the central focus of the image, no longer peripheral context, but a human-less 
subject in its own right whose material configurations are not subject to human narrative. 
In this way the rational language of representation is side-lined and these landscape forms 
leave behind the restrictive relationship they have with narrative – landscape as the 
“natural” setting for a “cultural” story, Their reformulation as twenty-first-century artworks 
unleashes their heterotopic force into a contemporary visuality underpinned by 
perspectival structures and shaped by global and digital capitalism. 
 
This process of re-appropriation (analysed in the next section) exploits a prac tice of 
“othering,” whereby the strangeness of these landscapes that operate out- side 
perspectival landscape space and representational image-making disrupts the sameness of 
the digitalised landscape image in its globalised, circulatory form. Landscape elements such 
as those depicted within the fresco cycles painted by Giotto or Pietro Lorenzetti in the 
Basilica of San Francesco, Assisi, problematize the overtly visual, later history of the 
landscape genre, with its prioritisation of naturalistically rendered extensive space laid out 
in front of the viewer who imagines (as depicted by Veronese) that they are looking through 
a window and could possibly step out onto the landscape beyond. 
 
Rather than understanding landscape as a kind of scenery in front of which the 
human subject appears, I 4utilise these forms in order to 4radicalise4 the idea of the 
background and to oppose the genre’s presentation of landscape as a cohesive view that 
extends across the picture plane and that provides an image of “nature” in which the 
(human) subject is then 4contextualised through narrative. Any previous narrative or scenic 
elements are removed, opening up the purely visual to new temporal and material 
possibilities, and shifting the resonance of landscape from space to time. A displacement 
from landscape as image to landscape as fellow material body, even something fragile that 
requires care, occurs. A fragment is the opposite to an extensive view and my works 
prioritise materiality over visuality, demanding imaginative and affective contact with their 
appropriated landscape forms, disarranging flat visual representation in the process. In this 
way they also shift our received understanding of historical linearity, bringing the distant 
past into the contemporary; earlier forms rediscovered as “unfamiliar” acting on the 
present, positing a different potential for landscape. Indeed, as Foucault says of Borges’s 
Chinese encyclopaedia, “the exotic charm of another system of thought, is the [5realisation 
of the] limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that” (1989, xvi, italics in 
original). 
 
If analysis from the field of art history primarily entails a process of looking and 
writing, the process of making (or “re-making”) introduces a new form of contact with an 
earlier painting, which emphasises the material “other” of the image. And by exploiting the 
paradoxical qualities that are concealed within our habituated perspectival modes of 
viewing, attention is brought to a spatial present via a new material body that moves 
between then and now, critiquing the 5spectacularised capitalist subject that is always 
headed towards an idealised technological future. Following Foucault’s definition of 
heterotopia, these works reconfigure the relationship between language and the world, and 
so help rethink landscape as a “co -subject,” unfixing it from its structuring as “objective 
space.” As Foucault argues:  
 
Heterotopias are disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine language, 
because they make it impossible to name this and that, because they shatter or tangle 
common names, because they destroy “syntax” in advance, and not only the syntax 
with which we construct sentences but also that less apparent syntax which causes 
words and things (next to and also opposite one another) to “hold together.” . . . 
[H]eterotopias . . . desiccate speech, stop words in their tracks, contest the very 
possibility of grammar at its source; they dissolve our myths and sterilize the lyricism 
of our sentences. 
(Foucault 1989, xix, emphasis in text) 
 
The next section explores this idea of the co-subject through a discussion of four artworks 
that actively exploit the inherent tensions within the “syntax” that under- pins the landscape 
image including its relationship to narrative and to the human subject, to representation and 
to the technological appropriation of human vision associated with Western visual systems. 
 
 
Landscape as co-subject 
 
Landscape with a Spring (after Giotto) (Figure 7.2) explores what a landscape painting might 
mean if it contains no human narrative or subject. The painting shows a dry and featureless 
rocky outcrop in which, to the extreme bottom right, there is a small stream, a spring that 
emerges from a hole in the rocks. The painting copies from The Miracle of the Spring, part of the 
fresco cycle in the Upper Basil ica in Assisi painted between 1297 and 1299 and attributed to 
Giotto (1266–1337). The frescoes show stories from the life of Saint Francis, as recounted by 
the Fran ciscan Prior General, Bonaventura. Here, Francis is travelling in the mountains with 
two monks and a peasant who (according to Bonaventura) has lent him his donkey. The 
peasant is weak from exhaustion and in need of some water. Francis kneels down and prays, 
and a spring immediately appears which is subsequently never found again. The fresco 
thereby defines a place in which the heavenly has miraculously and momentarily broken 
through, revealing the already heterotopic formulation of this “landscape-place.” According to 
Foucault, the “Middle Ages” were a “hierarchical ensemble of places” where a cosmology 
existed in which “the supercelestial places . . . opposed . . . the celestial, and the celestial place 
was in turn opposed to the terrestrial place. It was this complete hierarchy, this opposition, 
this intersection of places that constituted what could very roughly be called medieval 
space” (Foucault 1989, 1). This hierarchy divided space, with each part understood in terms of 
its position within the whole. The world was shaped by symbols, whose language was hidden 
within it. Foucault’s discussion of the heterotopia is linked to this larger project that explores 
the relation between language and “things,” as exemplified in The Order of Things. He draws 
out the differing historical regimes of knowledge in Western thought, exploring ideas of 
representation and resemblance, and the persistence of language. Foucault sees that under 
the regime of representation (epitomised by Descartes’s thinking “I”) no resemblance is 
necessary between object and thought; a rational abstraction replaces the realms of symbolic 
correspondence that shaped the medieval world: “Representations are not rooted in a world 
that gives them meaning; they open of themselves on to a space that is their own, whose 





Figure 7.2 Landscape with a Spring (after Giotto), Henrietta Simson, 2010, 48 × 60 cm, oil and pigment on gesso 
 
Language, the “word of God,” shaped the medieval world through the idea of the “model”; it 
constituted the mystical origin of things, which could then reveal and bring forth its divine 
mysteries through symbols manifest in the physical world. In Giotto’s narrative, the sudden 
appearance of the spring is confirmation of God’s mysterious writing of the world. In this world 
of medieval resemblance, a deeper order (that of a divine mystery) is revealed through 
symbols. Conversely, in the world of representation, the world is “object” and this deeper 
order is revealed only in the thinking mind, which interprets the world and reflexively 
recognises itself and its relation to the divine. The “Word” has moved from the physical to the 
mental sphere and the landscape becomes extensive empty space bereft of miracles. In this 
world visual representation relies more on abstract mathematical qualities than it does on 
resemblance. However Foucault asserts that language persists in this visual, abstracted 
episteme of representation, although not in its previous existence, for “[i]t no longer appears 
hidden in the enigma of the mark” and not in future semiotic terms, “it has not yet appeared 
in the theory of signification” (1989, 87). Accordingly, it reinforces the hierarchy and ideology 
of a scientific culture and its rational representations, a culture that emphasises the  
“naturalness” of its images, and landscape as objective space. The power of the heterotopia 
lies in its ability to break this apart because it breaks apart the order of language, interrupting 
the way it shapes things, undermining its relation to the spatial. 
 
Giotto’s fresco reveals the world as resemblance, divine mystery underscored in the 
sudden appearance of the spring. Landscape with a Spring (after Giotto) is of a different order 
– the title only suggesting that there was once a more significant event attached to the spring 
– while the narrative figures which orientate the miracle and which populate a world of 
resemblance are gone. As a heterotopic landscape it becomes unfixed from the previous 
medieval order of resemblance, and simultaneously presents an image of landscape that is 
not of the perspectival order of representation. The divine breaks through in an instant in 
Giotto’s paint ing; here by breaking apart the language of representation and the visual, it is 
possible to focus on the landscape as subject in itself. 
 
  This absence of human narrative signals the lack of human subject. In Landscape  without 
Stigmata (after Pietro) (Figure 7.3), Pietro Lorenzetti’s (c.1280–1348) fresco of St. Francis 
Receiving his Stigmata, painted in c.1320 also in the San Francesco Basilica (Lower Church) in 
Assisi, is reconfigured into a small panel painting from which St. Francis and the other friar, the 
small chapel, the bridge, and the seraphic vision have all been removed. Only the landscape 
remains – a rocky wilderness, barren except for two trees that punctuate the skyline, the dark 
blue of which is covered with a muted earth-red wash. A ravine zigzags vertically down the 
centre of the painting, and a small stream flows down this, spilling out into the dark pool 
that fills the bottom of the picture plane, giving the barren mountains a watery base which acts 
as a visual barrier to the viewer. This painting highlights the vulnerability of the object (or 
landscape) exposed and laid bare by the lack of human narrative. This sense is reinforced by the 
brittle, fragile gesso surface on which the landscape is painted, which contributes to a feeling of 
pathos in the work, pointing to the need to care for the “other” – as object or landscape. The 
ravine, as “stigmata” suggests that the landscape has been “wounded,” by a presence no 
longer visible. This points to a new ecological ethics, where the lack of subject or figure, the 
“bracketed” human (as defined by Jane Bennett) (2010, ix) reveals the significance of the object 
in itself.2 The scene is replete with an entirety of matter, as if one is looking in on a distilled and 
distant world, human presence evident (but not privileged) not simply by dint of it being an 
artefact, but also by the landscape’s embodied character. This painted landscape does not rep- 
resent a “natural space” in terms of Cartesian logic or the perspectival tradition of landscape, 
but instead operates in terms of affective materiality and imagination. It is a landscape that 
carries its own histories, and the traces of human subjectivity are visible within these, but it 
does not employ perspectival space to situate and implicate the viewer within the scene; its 
focus is instead on the landscape in its own right, and the viewer is confronted with a landscape 
that no longer frames the  human subject, but that has re-positioned itself beyond the former 
subject/object hierarchies that shape the Western landscape tradition. 
 
  
Figure 7.3 Landscape without Stigmata (after Pietro), Henrietta Simson, 2008, 65 × 60 cm, oil and pigment on gesso 
 
 
Crucial to the definition of the pictorial object as defined through its affective 
materiality and not in terms of language (or human narrative), is the idea of distance.3 And 
by identifying the landscape image as “distant” it becomes easier to see it as a body in its 
own right, rather than its characterisation as a view that is required to contextualise the 
subject through narrative. Distance here is emphasised as historical rather than spatial, 
landscape as the ultimately inaccessible “other.” In an apparent aporia, redefining visuality 
and materiality in this way can foster a relationship between the human body and the 
landscape form that is founded on a shared embodiment. The process of removing the 
traces of subject matter so that the landscapes can stand as singular objects suggests affinity 
through the affective, a bodily rather than rationally based understanding, but this is a highly 
paradoxical empathy, these paintings being absolutely dissimilar in their emptiness.4 There is 
no human subject depicted in them by way of narrative; they cease to be “scenes” or 
“scenery” in which human drama is enacted, and instead become replete and “distant.” And 
as Timothy Morton says (not without irony): “To love extension . . . is to love the thingly quality 
of the other, in the ultimate, Cartesian sense: to respect what is truly other about the other” 
(2007, 179). Morton’s argument reveals how “Nature” – the Cartesian “extension” of matter 
and space through which landscape is defined – is a constructed and problematic category, 
and he challenges the subject/object dualist constructions of the Western philosophical 
tradition. But through “loving” the “other” (in this case the res extensa of Descartes’s cogito), 
we begin to empathise with that which is truly not the human subject. By recognising the 
distance within this shared but separated embodiment, landscape overcomes its role as 
backdrop to human life. Landscape as visual experience and landscape as material object 
become equally distributed within this work. 
 
Hills and Other Spaces (after Martini) (Figure 7.4) develops a critique of the landscape 
image by drawing on Foucault’s discussion of language as the hidden heart of representation 
that shapes and controls the rational understanding of images. It explores the tension 
between representational images and language. This tension, concealed and fundamental to 
the hierarchical formation of a separate human subjectivity, informs our perception of images 
as rationally drawn spatial structures. The painting again straddles two historical eras, but it 
also straddles different spatialities and in doing so reveals the assumptions of the perspective 
paradigm and how this maintains the visual order of subjects and objects. The discussion of 
the previous two works was focussed on how the landscape can become a discursive object; 
here the focus is perspectival – how the assumptions of rational language and natural vision 
hide the fractured nature of the human subject (a fracturing rich in potentiality). The work is 
loosely drawn from Simone Martini’s (1284–1344) equestrian portrait of Guidoriccio da 
Fogliano in the Sala del Consiglio in Siena’s town hall, painted in c.1330. It consists of two
 
Figure 7.4 Hills and Other Spaces (after Martini), Henrietta Simson, 2014, 64 × 49 cm, oil on gesso panel 
 
opposing hills, bleak with no distinguishing features other than a small lake on the top of the 
flat-topped hill to the right. The rocky ground is pale and arid, the effect a combination of the 
smooth but irregular surface of the gesso ground and a layering of painted washes. The 
contrasting sky is a deep blue, implying a night scene. In the sky, slightly to the left and high 
up towards the top edge of the panel, are two black circles that suggest orbs or holes. As 
orbs, they form two dark stars, but the impossibility that the light in the painting that falls 
across the hills and lake emanates from them instantly alters the viewer’s perception, and they 
instead become holes in the gesso surface. They oscillate, being part of the pictorial illusion 
(as orbs) then part of the structure of the panel (as holes). Either way they are interruptions 
and break up the representational order of the painting. By doing so, they force it away from 
illusion so that the viewer is confronted with their own viewing, and recognises the image’s 
and their own materiality within a more fully described visuality. As Dehaene and De Cauter 
state in their discussion of the triadic notion of heterotopic space, “Other spaces are 
alternative spaces, altered spaces, and often also alternating spaces, in the sense that two 




Hills and Other Spaces is an “alternating” space that exploits the inherently unstable nature of 
the viewing subject (and by extension the perspectival image), uncanny in its construction 
around the presence and absence of sight.5 The black circles in the painting act like the black 
holes of the pupils, two eyes viewing the image from an unconnected point, so that the act of 
viewing or looking is revealed to the viewer, but from the opposite side of what is viewed, 
uncannily reminding them that the unified self is an idealised impossibility, the fantasy 
presented by capitalist images. As “holes” in the image’s surface, these eyes become blind 
spots that key absence – the absence of light and of sight, and of subjectivity. In order for 
globalised visuality to move beyond representation, these fallibilities need to be brought into 
continuous play and not disregarded in idealising constructions of vision and the self. And this 
is ultimately an appeal to the uncanny, to the unfamiliar that abides within the familiar as 
described by Freud, and used by recent writers such as Morton, to build new arguments for 
landscape and the human.6 
 
 
Christine Boyer has recently discussed the problems of representation expounded by 
Foucault in his writing on the paintings of Velazquez and Manet, and recognises the presence 
of ideology in these “natural” images that are under- stood in terms of the mirror when she 
asks, “How is it that representation, an illusory image formed in the mirror, kills imagination 
and critical perspective?” (Boyer 2008, 70). This ideological construction of the painting as an 
image that passively and accurately reflects space as opposed to actively constructing it 
through language (an image that we “take as read” and assume to be “accurate”) is exposed 
in Foucault’s discussion of Las Meninas. Here he draws out the differences (and collusions) 
between the representational painting and the mirror, and between language and image and 
how these construct the viewing subject. As Boyer states, 
 
Recurring in Foucault’s discourse on “other” spaces and on painting is the place of the 
spectator-subject, along with metaphors of the gaze and the mir ror. In obscure and 
confused operations, Foucault is posing the problem of how the visible confronts the 
articulable, and how a counter-site is opened up. 
(2008, 61) 
 
The visible and sayable, meshed in an uncomfortable complicity under the order of 
representation, when shown to be incompatible (in Foucault’s argument through the 
operations of the heterotopic mirror) allow the viewer to see how this “natural” vision is 
shaped by rational language. In an instant they are able “to comprehend the imaginary 
experience of the gaze via its imaginary displacement” (Boyer 2008, 62). This is how the 
black circles in Hills and Other Spaces function. By detaching the image from perspectival 
norms, where the spectator is always implied, the latter is confronted with ambiguity. And 
it is within the space of uncertainty that the imagination can move, and that visual orders 
can reconfigure. 
 
The processes of layering different spaces (so that that which is represented within the 
image is juxtaposed with the physical space of the viewer) and/or times (the historical past 
of the artwork and its reformulation within the present) are forms of spatial-temporal 
disruption, heterotopic actions that break apart the implied cohesive whole of the 
landscape image, replacing this with fragmented constructions that do not privilege the 
visual human subject. The strongly felt sense of embodiment within the medieval and 
Renaissance image is utilised so that these works can contest the present incarnation of the 
subject under capitalism, a virtual avatar, constructed through the latest (digital) 
perspective technologies. These govern and order visual space so that images become 
space per se –  l i ved space conflated with representation – the former thus remaining 
inert and unconstructed, while the material reality that constructs the image is effaced (this 
effacement required if “natural vision” is to be simulated effectively). As a means  to move 
beyond this, it is necessary to pull apart the psychological layering of the two-dimensional 
image’s “screen” – its symbolic interface – so that this imbrication of visual, actual, and 
pictorial space can be unpicked. In Foucault’s “third principle” he states that “[t]he 
heterotopia is capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that 
are in themselves incompatible” (Foucault 1986, 25). These paintings, “incompatible” in 
their non-representational, non-perspectival spaces act as “holes” in the main spatial 
milieu, and through a productive process of de-familiarisation, expose to ourselves our own 
sense of space, of landscape, inviting us to see anew. 
 
Di Paolo Blue Wilderness (Figure 7.5) is a work that develops this idea of layering, exploring 
it via contrasting spatial and technological processes, combining sculptural forms, digital 
photographic manipulation, and pre-perspectival image space, and in doing so shows the 
technological elision of representational images and spatial experience. The modelled clay 
hills appear incongruous within the projected digital space and the technologically 
produced perspectival image is examined via this rearrangement, its paradoxical properties 
exposed. The work uses the wilderness landscape in which John the Baptist, depicted by 
Giovanni di Paolo (1403–1482) in 1454, roams, to defy the definitions imposed by the 
established terms of perspectival landscape or the textual de- construction of these, and 
instead focuses on an affective response to the material construction (rather than the 
removed or disregarded narrative forms) of the work. It draws out embodied connections 
and presents space in materially orientated ways rather than as that which is rationally 
cohesive and understood in purely visual terms. This recasting of the landscape image as 
embodiment – as opposed to a space constructed through the perspectival – moves 
beyond these restrictive categories, towards the notion, set out by Dehaene and De Cauter, 
of the heterotopia as play (2008, 87–102). In their argument they draw out the duality of 
labour and action that Hannah Arendt describes as “the human condition,” introducing a 
third space that incorporates the “([now] mostly secularized) sacred space” of cultural and 
playful activities that they see as the innately creative and “irreducible” aspects of life (De 
Cauter and Dehaene 2008, 95). They define the Greek theatre and other recreational 
spaces as part of this heterotopic intermediary “third sphere” that mediates between the 
public and the private through a sense of play. Blue Wilderness “plays” with the norms of 
Western visuality, the habituated spatial perceptions produced under the assumptions of 
representation, what a landscape should do or be in a neo-liberal world, so that the knotted 
relationship between the landscape image and the landscape as a recreational space is 
revealed. 
 
As a photographic or perspectival image, landscape becomes the desired object – 
the space itself, a conundrum recognised by Hubert Damisch as the fascination that 
perspective painting holds for us. Christopher Wood describes it thus: “We know the 
representation is not reality; and yet to a point we react to it as if it were real. Damisch 
calls this the double articulation of painting, representation and presence” (Wood 1995, 
678). This “double articulation” emphasises the commodification of landscape under 
contemporary capitalism. It is sign and substitute simultaneously. It is a place of depicted 
recreation where one might go to escape from the travails of labour. Wood has discussed 
how these formulations are remarkably consistent throughout the history of landscape 
under capitalist visuality, where it is not only conceived as “parergonal” in terms of its 
function within the painting, but also in terms of work: “Recreation in Western pictorial 
culture . . . is meant to follow work and therefore stand outside it. It is, per haps, a 
reward for work completed. But pleasure also prepares one to resume work by restoring or 
recreating the spirit” (Wood 1993, 55). This not only reflects contemporary attitudes to 
landscape, but its definition as recreational “parergon” is also found within Thomas Blount’s 
Glossographia of 1670, in the period that popularised the genre of landscape painting in the 
West.7 Landscape today is a place of tourism and recreation, a place to visit for the 
weekend or for a holiday. As an image it is tied up with this idea, a sign of leisure, adjunct to 
the capitalist economy. In this form it is invariably shown in romanticised and idealised 
terms, always clean, perhaps majestic, ultimately waiting there in the beyond to “refresh the 
spirit” or provide an “experience” (“the holiday of a lifetime”). These images work as 
excessive signs, as if the refreshment only needs to happen visually. Likewise Wood 
describes how the act of painting sixteenth-century landscapes was seen as respite enough 
for the painter, it was not necessary to actually go anywhere; the process of painting itself 
was sufficient (Wood 1993, 55). Landscape in this form is visually consumed. Indeed, as 
Nicholas Mirzoeff underlines, “[c]apital has commodified all aspects of everyday life 
including the human body and even the process of looking itself” (1999, 27).  
 
Dehaene and De Cauter explore the heterotopia through the idea of the holiday, with 
its etymological reference to what is holy (“holi”-day) underscoring the importance of 
recreation. They state that “[h]eterotopia is perhaps more easily identified by its time than by 
its space. It is not simply a space but rather a time-space” (De Cauter and Dehaene 2008, 92). 
Although the “time-space” of the commodified landscape image is fleeting (it is the interstitial 
“time-space” of the screen-saver), more widely, the leisure space of landscape under capitalism 
frequently acts as the space in which this “holy” time occurs. It becomes a “time- space.” This 
“time-space” also describes the function of the early wilderness landscape, the caves and arid 
mountains depicted in the paintings that shape my practice. Located outside habitual living 
space, the wilderness landscape operates within its own time, a liminal place of transformation 
where life and death exist in close proximity. As depicted within these early paintings, saints and 
holy men and women departed to these places, withdrawing from society (and from the body) 
to prepare the soul for entry into heaven. These alien landscapes, removed from habitual  
 
Figure 7.5 Di Paolo Blue Wilderness, Henrietta Simson, 2018, 50 × 36 cm, digital image, oil on clay 
 
patterns of time and space, facilitated penance. Blue Wilderness, itself removed from habitual 
patterns of time and space with its non-corresponding elements, is a landscape that invites 
the imagination in, not for the distracted or passive enjoyment of the fleeting commodified 




By appropriating the landscape forms of historical painting, through a process that layers and 
rearranges different temporal strata and in doing so breaks down the fixity of 
representational space, it is possible to access difference from within the dominant 
perspectival systems in a way that enriches our virtualised visuality. The process of removing 
the human subject – so central to these works – identifies how visual representation – the 
iconic – has operated in terms of the linguis tic; how vision and narrative have been allied 
since Alberti’s humanist concerns for perspective and the Cartesian annexing of the visual 
within rational thought. By directing attention towards the affective possibilities of the image 
that arise from its embodied forms rather than from its narrative elements, it is possible to 
instead explore an idea of a shared materiality that collapses the dualistic hierarchy of human 
subject/landscape object and that shifts the notion of distance from a “view” to a material 
background brought close, or a distant past brought present. This process interrupts the 
perspectival norms by which we habitually define images, and instead directs their appeal 
towards that which is affective and unfamiliar, accessing the uncanny and revealing the 
representational image’s ultimate failure to represent its object. The works exist in a form of 
“in-betweenness,” and in this way they stretch the dualisms that are held to be so restrictive,  
establishing new possibilities for landscape as a category. As Hilde Heynen suggests, “Pursuing 
the idea of heterotopia offers a productive strategy . . . because it introduces a third term in 
situations where strict dichotomies – such as public/ private; urban/rural or local/global – no 
longer provide viable frameworks for analysis” (2008, 312). Utilising this “third term” within 
landscape and its representations opens up the dualistic problem of landscape/image, the 
heterotopia providing a useful methodology for moving beyond the impasse of the landscape 
image in its traditional forms. These landscapes move away from the dichotomies of 
nature/culture, subject/object primarily because they resist definitions set out by the genre of 
landscape painting and its perspectival structuring. They are not images of “natural” 
landscapes but cultural appropriations, and they are no longer the “object” through which the 
“subject” is constructed. As “outsiders” they escape the (perspectival, ideological) landscape 
way of seeing, and crucially, as parergonal forms they can be unfixed from their original time 
and can act on the present in ways that do not lock them into strict definitions as “previous” 
or “historical.” This “in-betweeness” presents an inherent instability: they are not past nor 
strictly present, they are not nature and they do not establish an idea of landscape by using 
traditional landscape tropes. The works interrupt visual/spatial norms through this unbuckling 
of chronological syntax. This is a profoundly heterotopic process, one that reconfigures the 
habitual definitions of landscape in terms of human narrative, and uproots these unfamiliar 
background forms from their supportive roles within their original locations. The 
reintroduction of these landscape forms into this culture, causes a disturbance in capitalist 
space-time, creating a “heterochrony” – a “slice[] of time” – as Foucault calls it, that 
interrupts time’s linear progression as something that we pass through (2008, 20). Instead 
time accumulates, so that we are removed from its habitual patterning as streamlined and 
linear. Indeed, these landscapes do not operate within the spatial norms of contemporary 
Western culture either, disrupting these by the addition of their accumulated time. Spatial 
configurations that are not constructed by a Cartesian representational system are brought 
forward through the 700 years or so that their landscape forms have endured. They slip 
between past and present, “space-images” that re-focus the imagination on the landscape 
itself, its accrued time and its material body that is not just an image. 
 
In Specters of Marx, Jacques Derrida establishes an ethics of appropriation where 
historical forms are not so much taken possession of, but rather the complex operation 
between “ghost” and present purpose is acknowledged and the historical form allowed to 
“speak” (Derrida 1994). These “ghosts” offer forgotten alternatives and present new 
potentialities. Rather than blending difference into the hegemonic conditions of 
globalisation, the appropriated forms can instead destabilise the spatial-temporal norm. 
This action defines the works here as part of a critical strategy of remembering, working in 
counter to the “eternalised present” of the Internet, and its specifically dislocated and 
spectacularised form of subjec tivity that shapes twenty-first-century capitalism. Rather 
than being made from adapted commodities or directly carving out new meanings for 
historical objects, the works exist within the terms of a translation or transcription. The 
appropriated historical forms bring their own language to notions of the contemporary 
image, whose digital and cyber context is assumed in a fixed technological trajectory.  As Hal 
Foster states, “The deployment of the outmoded . . . can still query the totalistic assumptions 
of capitalist culture, never more grandiose than today” (2004, 16). 
 
Foucault’s project was always focussed, as Boyer suggests, on the “active 
engagement in liberation movements for prisoners, asylum inmates, student resistances – 
all targets of administrative power and all inspired by the dream of a radical subjective 
freedom” (2008, 63). A new ethics can be found within the space of the heterotopia, 
where these paintings become discursive objects that act as facilitators and extend this 
“subjective freedom” to the landscape itself. They show how the previous division of 
subject/object that enforces the carefully separated forms that constitute images of 
landscape are problematically rigid in a world where such division is no longer possible, 
not even at bedrock level. Exploring these older visual conventions in the context of 
digitally produced and disseminated images also locates Western visual culture within its 
technological history. Materiality and visuality are realigned and this has implications for 
our spatial imaginings, and for how subjectivity is shaped. These works contribute to a 
discourse that challenges the removal of space (as landscape here) to the abstract realm of 
representation, where its radical potentiality is reduced. The need to understand space 
in broader and more dynamic terms is urgent, and the landscape image – rather than 
reinforcing it as representation – can do this via the actions of the heterotopia. 
 
Notes 
1 Works such as Vision and Painting (1983) by Norman Bryson supersede previous 
definitions of the image as put forward by art historians such as Ernst Gombrich in Art 
and Illusion (1977). 
2 In Vibrant Matter (2010), Jane Bennett explores the question of the inherent agency 
within matter in terms that remove the hierarchical binary between subjects and 
objects, while not collapsing her thinking into a disempowering refusal of the human. In 
order to do this she “brackets” the human and re-examines social processes, 
accommodating the non-human components that exist within them. 
3 For a discussion of images in terms of distance see Jean-Luc Nancy, “The Image – the 
Distinct” in The Ground of the Image (2005). For the re-thinking of distance as a positive 
and essential characteristic of landscape see John Wylie, “The Distant. Thinking toward 
Renewed Senses of Landscape and Distance” in Environment, Space, Place (2017). I am 
indebted to both arguments in shaping my own ideas of distance and landscape in my 
practice. 
4 In his introduction to Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus, Brian Massumi 
defines affect as a “prepersonal intensity” (1987, xvii). He later explores it as related (but 
prior) to “feelings” (personal) and “emotions” (social) in “The Autonomy of Affect”  (1995) 
and in Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (2002). 
5 Much has been written about the uncanny nature of the gaze. See especially Jacques 
Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis (1998). 
6 For the uncanny in terms of landscape, see Jean-Luc Nancy, “Uncanny Landscapes” 
(2005); Tim Morton, The Ecological Thought (2010); and John Wylie, “The Distant” 
(2017). 
7 See Malcolm Andrews (1999, 30). See also Jacques Derrida (1987) for a discussion of the 
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